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Despite the huge upheavals in financial and industrial structure of
the past decade, the European insurance markets, with the partial
exception of the United Kingdom and Switzerland, have traditionally
remained highly fragmented national markets. In contrast to the bank-
ing and securities sectors, they have been overprotected and have not
been part of any globalization process. This may be explained partly by
the specificity of the insurance business, which has historically given
rise to excessively restrictive regulatory systems, and partly by the
existence of cultural differences and practices, which by themselves
have restricted domestic competition and made foreign penetration
difficult.
In view of this situation, the limited impact of the first attempt by
the European Community in the 1970s to open insurance markets
through the freedom of establishment is not surprising. In recent years,
however, the process of insurance market integration has been set in
motion, to some extent by autonomous factors such as the blurring of
frontiers in financial services and the linkages between financial sectors,
but mainly in the context of the European Community’s plan to
complete the internal market by the end of 1992. An important part
of this ambitious project is the creation of an integrated financial area,
with full liberalization of capital movements and the free supply of
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financial services across borders in the field of banking, securities, and
insurance.
The first section of this paper highlights the basic structural char-
acteristics of the European insurance markets. The following section
analyzes the current balance between insurance regulation and compe-
tition in the context of the European Community’s financial integration
program, the proposals relating to insurance, and the outlook for
effective opening of the markets. This is followed by a discussion of the
regulatory interactions of the insurance sector with the banking sector at




The insurance business is well developed in several European
countries. After suffering declines in the early 1980s, insurance markets
in Europe have been expanding, although not as quickly as in Japan,
which has seen its share of total world premiums rise steeply (partly at
the expense of the United States) from only 2.2 percent in 1960 to 24
percent in 1988. Europe’s share that year is estimated to have been about
30 percent, compared with 37 percent in the United States. The European
Cormnunity (EC) accounted for 23 percent, while Switzerland and the
non-EC Scandinavian countries accounted for most of the remainder of
Europe’s share.1
In line with population size, the largest markets in Europe are
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, jointly accounting for more
than 75 percent of the EC total direct insurance production in 1988. Italy,
a country with a similar population size, participated with a bare 7.5
percent, implying a much less developed market.
Relative Size
Two frequently used indicators of the development of the insurance
sector in a country are shown in Table 1. The first relates the level of
annual premiums to national income and measures the flow of savings
through insurance expenditure. The second relates the level of annual
premiums to population and measures the concentration of insurance in
1 The relative shares in world GDP are: 20 percent for the United States and for the
European Community, and 11 percent for Japan. Thus, Japan’s share of premiums is very
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Table 1
Basic Indicators of Development of the Insurance Industry, 1988
Annual Average % Insurance
Premiumsa as Per Capita Growth of Employmentb as
a Percentage Premiums~ Premiums a Percentage of
Country of GNP (U.S. Dollars) 1984-88 Total
Ireland 11.4 938 4 n.a.
United Kingdom 9.3 1,358 13 1.34
Netherlands 7.5 1,180 14 .83
France 6.4 1,123 20 .97
Spain 6.3 546 64 .53
Germany 6.2 1,241 12 .91
Denmark 5.6 1,128 18 .52
Belgium 5.1 775 14 1.59
Luxembourg 3.1 762 19 n.a.
Portugal 3.0 122 26 1.27
Italy 2.9 415 20 .61
Greece 1.4 76 18 .98
EC Average 5.7 805 20 .95
United States 10.0 1,965 7 1.76
Japan 9.9 2,292 26 2.67
aDirect business plus reinsurance accepted
blncludes intermediaries
Source: Sigma, publication of the Swiss Reinsurance Company; OECD Insurance Statistics; and
EUROS TAT.
a country. The higher the indexes, the higher the development of the
country’s insurance industry.
Differences in operating costs and investment efficiency, as well as
exchange rate considerations in the case of the second indicator, may
distort comparability. Table i shows, however, that the insurance sector
is highly developed in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
compared to that of the southern EC countries. France, Germany, and
Spain stand in the middle. The position of Ireland is partly explained by
preferential tax treatment of life insurance premiums, in conjunction
with high marginal rates of income tax, and that of Japan by the
preponderance of single-premium business, motivated by low interest
rates on deposits. Among the non-EC countries (not shown in Table 1),
the ratio of premiums to GDP is very high (12.1) in Switzerland, and the
ratios in Sweden and Finland are somewhat higher than the EC average.
Financial Intermediation
The role of the insurance sector in the financial intermediation
process can be indicated by the value it adds to national income or by its168 Sotirios Kollias
contribution to total employment, the latter also shown in Table 1. It
appears that for EC countries the sector contributes relatively more, in
terms of employment, in the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Portugal.
Since the latter two countries have a relatively underdeveloped insur-
ance sector, more employment suggests a certain degree of inefficiency.
Another measure of the importance of the life insurance industry in
the domestic financial market is the ratio of life funds (that is, reserves
and other liabilities to policyholders) to national income. Data are not
readily available, however. It has been reported that this ratio is about 30
percent in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Japan, and about 20
percent in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States (Vittas and
Scully 1990). Such ratios imply that life funds represent a substantial
pool of resources. It should be noted, however, that interactions with
pension fund regimes (substitutability, cultural aspects, fiscal treatment
and the like) should be taken into consideration if precise comparisons
are to be made.
Efficiency
Comparisons of efficiency are difficult because any single indicator
cannot capture all explanatory factors, such as regulatory intensity,
operating costs, investment returns, business mix, and so on. In
general, the performance of the insurance industry in Europe is consid-
ered to have been better than in the United States or Japan.
The ratio of life funds to gross premiums could be used as a proxy for
the efficiency of the life insurance industry. It takes account of operating
costs and investment returns, but it can be distorted by differences in the
business mix or in reserve policies. Over the period 1986-88, this ratio
fluctuated between 6.5 and 7.0 in Germany and Switzerland and between
6.0 and 6.5 in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and around 5.0 in
the United States and 4.0 in Japan. The high ratios in Germany and
Switzerland probably reflect conservative reserve policies, that for the
United Kingdom probably reflects investment efficiency, and that for the
Netherlands low operating costs. The relatively low rates in the United
States and Japan reflect high operating costs and low investment returns as
well as a business mix that requires a lower volume of reserves (a large
proportion of single-premium life policies).
The rate of return on investment of assets of life insurance compa-
nies may be a better indicator of efficiency, but data are not available. It
is estimated that U.K. companies achieve average rates of 15 to 20
percent, against 7 to 8 percent for German companies. Even if allowance
is made for differences in the inflation rate, the U.K. companies appear
to be more efficient, mainly as a result of their greater freedom to invest
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Profitability
Comparisons between countries are difficult because of differences
in accounting, tax, and prudential regimes, and many other factors.
Only a few general trends can be observed.
In the nonlife subsector, underwriting has resulted in constant
losses (negative ratio of underwriting income to premiums), with the
only exception being Germany° All other European countries have
incurred losses averaging about 10 percent a year over the period
1983-87 (de Lecea 1991). These losses, however, were more than
compensated for by the sharp increase in asset values. Thus, nonlife
insurance undertakings appear to survive because of a pure financial
intermediation role, that is, collecting funds in order to invest, rather
than by performing a profitable economic activity.
In the life subsector, yields have been positive. The shareholders’
profits as a percentage of annual premiums vary substantially, however,
from one country to another. This is explained by the different statutory
rules regarding the allocation of profits between shareholders and
policyholders. German companies are mandated to rebate 90 percent of
any surplus to policyholders, whereas in the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and Spain, shareholders receive most of capital gains.
A survey conducted by the EC Commission regarding the perfor-
mance of composite versus specialized life insurance companies showed
that over the 10-year period since 1979, out of 4,000 companies autho-
rized within the European Community, only four cases of winding up of
specialized life companies occurred, along with several failures of
specialized nonlife companies. No failures of composite companies
occurred.
It has been reported that in 1990 (not a representative year from
which to draw conclusions), the United Kingdom’s five big composite
insurers revealed a combined pre-tax loss of more than $1 billion,
compared to a profit of more than $1.5 billion in 1989 (The Economist,
February 9, 1991). Falling property and share prices, where U.K.
insurers predominantly invest, as well as bad past decisions are the
main reasons for this performance. In general, however, U.K. insurers
have enjoyed profits. They have been involved in less damaging
competition than their U.S. counterparts, but in more risk-taking than
the other European insurers.170 Sotirios Kollias
Regulation and Competition
With the exception of reinsurance, which has an international market,2
European insurance markets have traditionally remained isolated in na-
tional markets. Legal barriers to cross-border trade, on grounds of con-
sumer protection, and restrictive regulatory frameworks, country-specific
distribution channels, and differences in customs and practices have
prevented both external and domestic competition. As a result, different
products, but also wide price differences, have prevailed between coun-
tries.
Regulatory intensity has not been the same in all European coun-
tries. Germany followed by France and the southern EC countries are
considered to be highly regulated. Last on the list could be the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which rely strongly on market
forces and keep regulatory intervention to the absolute minimum. This
can also be supported by the number of employees in regulatory
agencies in 1990:320 in Germany, 250 in France, 116 in the Netherlands
and only 73 in the United Kingdom (Finsinger 1990). The regulatory
intensity seems to be closely correlated with the price levels of life and
nonlife insurance, as contained in a 1988 Price Waterhouse report. Italy
and France reported the highest prices while the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom reported the lowest. Prices in Germany appeared
lower than those in Italy and France, but this was probably due to the
fact that German companies are mandated to rebate 90 percent of any
surplus to policyholders, and not due to more competition.
More recently, and especially since 1988, the regulatory and compet-
itive situation has started to change. Country-driven deregulation, new
products, new methods of distribution, and the creation of new spheres of
power are taking place through mergers, acquisitions, establishment of
bank/insurance subsidiaries or participation links, and cooperation agree-
ments between insurance companies and between insurance companies
and banks. Out of the 40 most significant bank/insurance acquisitions in
the EC between 1985 and 1990, ten deals involved institutions of different
countries (Thomas 1991). The main motivation for such changes is prepa-
ration for increased competition in view of the EC’s project to create a
Single European Market by the end of 1992.
The First EC Directives: Freedom of Establishment
The first attempts of the European Community to open up compe-
tition in direct insurance markets go back to the 1970s. Two pieces of
2 An EC directive of 1964 requires all member states to remove all restrictions upon
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legislation, the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, adopted in 1973, and
the First Life Directive, adopted in 1979, laid down some basic rules for
setting up branches and agencies throughout the Community.3 In
addition, the Life Directive introduced the principle of specialization,
that is, a company could carry out either life or non-life business. It
allowed existing composite companies to continue to operate, however.
The integration impact has been insignificant. Over the period
1975-86, the share of foreign companies remained virtually unchanged
in the four largest EC countries. In 1986, it ranged from 3.7 percent in
Germany to 4.8 percent in the United Kingdom, and none of the four
countries had shares of foreign companies above 13 percent, even if
domestic companies with foreign majority interest are added. The
corresponding shares in Spain and the Netherlands were twice as large.
The number of foreign insurers increased at first but decreased dramat-
ically in the 1980s (Finsinger 1990).
The absence of an appreciable impact of the freedom of establish-
ment on integration and competition could be attributed to the substan-
tial differences in the domestic regulatory frameworks that the foreign
undertakings had to comply with. It could also partly be attributed to a
series of obstacles that have prevented foreign establishments from
operating freely: country-specific distribution channels; the general
rules concerning accounting, company law, and contract law; and the
existence of state monopolies for certain lines of business.
In recent years, however, a wave of intra-Community mergers and
acquisitions (one element of the insurers’ strategies to exploit the
expected advantages of the 1992 single market) has taken place, in
particular in the rapidly growing markets of Italy, Spain, and, to a lesser
extent, France: that is, in countries where regulation has traditionally
been high. Substantial foreign penetration, but mainly from outside the
Community, has also been observed in the United Kingdom, which was
probably chosen as a base from which non-EC insurers can operate
throughout the European Community after 1992.
The EC Financial Integration Plan
The adoption in 1987 of the Single European Act institutionalized
the European Commission’s program--known as the White Paper--to
complete the internal market by December 31, 1992: that is, to create an
area without frontiers in which goods, services, capital, and persons
circulate freely.4 An essential part of this project is the creation of an
3 The Insurance Directives mentioned in this article are listed in the references.
4 The Single European Act modified the Treaty of Rome. Besides updating the internal
market provisions, the most important of which are the 1902 deadline for its completion172 Sotirios Kollias
Table 2
Program of Financial Integration
I. Basic Requirements
Freedom of all capital movements
Freedom of establishment of institutions
Free cross-border supply of services in the
Banking sector
Securities markets (investment services)
Insurance sector
Harmonization of prudential rules
II. Other Parameters
Relations with third countries
Stability of exchange rates
Fiscal aspects
Approximation in company taxation
Approximation in interest income taxation
Elimination of tax-preferential treatment in favor of domestic securities and
domestic institutions
Pension funds: review of prudential rules, in particular of restrictions on investment of
assets abroad
Payment systems: improvement in terms of efficiency and cost
Social aspects: prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering
integrated financial area, the two main components being the full
liberalization of capital movements and the free supply of financial
services in the field of banking, securities, and insurance. As with
economic integration, financial integration is expected to bring impor-
tant efficiency gains through more competition and exploitation of
economies of scale, thus implying a wider choice, at lower prices, of
financial products for the consumer and increased international compet-
itiveness of the financial sector of the EC economy.
The requirements for financial integration are listed in Table 2.
Freedom of insurers to establish operations in another member state and
free cross-border supply of insurance are essential elements. But these
freedoms cannot be effective for integration and competition without
harmonization of prudential and regulatory systems, which vary enor-
mously between the member states. Harmonization is a difficult task,
and replacement of unanimity by qualified majority (56/74) vote for many decisions, it
introduced Community powers in new fields, such as economic policy cooperation, social
and economic cohesion, research and development, and the environment. Moreover, it
formalized the status of the European Council (meetings of Heads of. State) and upgraded
the role of the European Parliament in the EC decision-making. The White Paper is a list
of about 300 measures needed to complete the internal market that the Commission
proposed to elaborate, mostly in the form of directives, and submit to the Council for
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Table 3
The Approach of the EC Commission to the Harmonization of Prudential Rules
Objectives: Liberalization and integration of markets
Protection of investors and depositors
Solvency of financial institutions
Equal conditions of competition
(level playing field)
Single license, permitting a financial institution to set up a subsidiary in
the other states without new authorization and new capital endowment
Few basic definitions and rules, in particular those concerning capital
adequacy and the covering of risks
Mutual recognition of rules and standards not harmonized at the
Community level
Home country control, that is, supervision of subsidiaries abroad by the
country where their head office is located
Principles:
especially in the insurance field, because it is characterized by many
particularities. Table 3 shows the conceptual approach of the EC
Commission to this central issue. The principles of "single license,"
"mutual recognition," and "home country control" play a crucial role in
solving the problem. They are designed to ensure consumer protection,
solvency of institutions, and "level playing field" conditions in a flexible
market environment.
The Second EC Directives: "Large" versus "Mass" Risks
The basic principles in Table 3 have already been applied to banking
legislation5 and have been incorporated in a proposal for a directive
concerning the securities markets.6 In the insurance sector, while
staying within the general harmonization framework, it has been
necessary to follow a two-stage approach because of a landmark
judgment of the European Court of Justice.7 While confirming the right
to provide cross-border insurance services, the Court argued for a
greater degree of harmonization for the protection of small policyhold-
ers ("mass risks") than for industrial or commercial customers ("large
risks"). The distinction has been crucial in the subsequent legislative
work regarding the application of the principle of home country super-
visory control.
Two pieces of legislation, the Second Non-Life Directive, adopted in
5 Second Banking Directive: 89/646/EEC, OJ/L/386 of 30.12.1989.
6 Commission Proposal for a Directive on Investment Services: COM (88) 778, OJ C 43
of 22.2.1989.
7 Judgment of 4 December 1986 in Case 205/84: Commission versus Germany, France,
Ireland, and Denmark~Freedom to provide insurance services.174 Sotirios Kollias
1988, and the Second Life Directive, adopted in 1990, liberalized
cross-border supply of insurance in cases deemed to require relatively
less protection: the former liberalized large commercial risks, as of
January 1, 1990; the latter liberalized insurance sought by individuals
from abroad on their own initiative, as of January 1, 1993.8 Home
country control is applied to these cases, while the provision of "mass
risk" nonlife services and the marketing of life insurance abroad are to
continue to operate under the regulations of the host country.
The Proposals for Complete Freedom
Two more recent far-reaching framework proposals for third non-
life and life directives generalize the free supply of insurance under
home country control in all cases.9 They introduce coordination rules in
regard to technical provisions, the representation of assets, the contract
law, the abolition of state monopolies, and other aspects. An important
feature is the ending of specialization between life and nonlife business,
which had been imposed by the First Life Directive in 1979 for all newly
created companies.
Although a number of supplementary directives may be necessary
concerning the accounts of insurance companies, distribution aspects,
intermediaries and so on, the adoption of the above framework propos-
als will complete the legislative work concerning the integration of the
EC insurance markets and indeed that of financial integration in general.
Outlook for Effective Integration
In view of the above developments, the balance between regulation
and competition is expected to shift rather quickly from isolated national
markets to Community-wide integrated markets, and from highly
protected industries to a competitive environment. A deregulation-
reregulation process is taking place in such a way as to ensure consumer
protection and financial stability as well as market flexibility.
The Second Non-Life Directive has already established a Commu-
nity-wide market for large commercial risks, though its impact may turn
out to be limited since barriers in this line of business were relatively
lower and, in any case, much of the activity was already international.
The impact of the Second Life Directive should presumably be larger but
again, cultural differences may limit it. In addition, transitional periods
a Greece, Portugal and Ireland may defer the application of these directives until
January 1, 1999, while Spain may defer until January 1, 1997 and January 1, 1996,
respectively.
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have been arranged for countries where life insurance growth potential
is very high. For both directives, specific distribution networks en-
trenched in each country may be an indirect obstacle.
However, these directives and the prospect of the third proposals,
as well as the integration in the banking and securities markets, have
prompted the important structural changes that are now taking place in
the European insurance markets. Mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures,
cross-sector subsidiaries and direct participations, bank-insurance con-
glomerates, and network distribution alliances are part of the strategies
of the operators in order to compete in the new environment that is
being shaped.
Legal Frontiers with Banking
The structural, regulatory, and competitive environment of the
insurance industry in Europe is changing, not only because of EC
financial integration but also because of the phenomenon of conver-
gence between the insurance sector and the other financial sectors,
especially ba.nking. Autonomous forces, such as demographic develop-
ments, declining savings, changing consumer habits, and new commu-
nication and information technologies, have led to interpenetration of
markets and have reduced the fragmentation of activities. The conver-
gence, however, has been accelerated by the EC integration plan.
Banks have been challenged by life insurance companies and other
nonfinancial institutions and have lost part of their market share of
savings. In response, they have sought to expand their product range
into insurance and other areas, taking advantage of their distribution
networks and their huge customer bases. It is too early to assess these
strategies; nevertheless, the different cultures and sales skills in these
two lines of business suggest they may not lead to results that accord
with theoretical expectations.
Despite the growing interactions, insurance companies in Europe
remain legally distinct from banks and other financial institutions. This
section looks at the regulatory aspects of such interactions at the
production, distribution, and ownership levels.
Production
In all European countries, the business of insurance underwriting is
regulated under special law. Banks are not permitted to write insurance
business directly. The first EC directives on the freedom of establish-
ment limit the activities of insurance companies to insurance and to
operations directly linked with it. Such directly related operations may
bear similarities to non-insurance products, for instance, the granting of
a loan on the basis of an insurance policy or life insurance products with176 Sotirios Kollias
a financial component. Nevertheless, they are considered to be included
in the definition of insurance products.
Symmetrically, the production of banking services is confined to
banks. Thus, insurance services do not figure in the list of activities
annexed to the Second Banking Directive, which is the central piece of
legislation for the creation of the common market in banking. A few
exceptions, however, are observed in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Ireland
where for historical reasons certain banks, or all banks on a limited scale,
can directly produce insurance services.
Thus, the concept of production in general remains legally sepa-
rated between insurance and banking institutions, the rationale being
the different specificity of each sector (nature of risks, inverted produc-
tion cycle for insurance, and the like). Arguments against bank produc-
tion of insurance include the avoidance of tied-in sales and other
practices as well as conflicts in supervisory responsibilities.
In the European Community, separation of production is also
imposed within the insurance sector. The First Life Directive of 1979
established the principle of specialization, that is, either life or non-life
activity, for any newly created insurance company, while the Second
Life Directive of 1990 specifies that the existing composite companies
cannot benefit from being free to supply either form of services beyond
the end of 1995. Although the specialization is conceived as offering
more security to policyholders, the tendency towards the creation of
large financial groups has circumvented the effectiveness of specializa-
tion. In fact, the proposal for a third life directive suggests the ending of
such an obligation.
The legal distinction between banks and insurance companies,
however, has not prevented convergence at the product level. The
financial (savings) component traditionally incorporated into most life
insurance products has swelled, especially through new products (such
as variable capital and insurance-capitalization products) and through
group life insurance. Some of the new products have grown very rapidly
in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. On the other
hand, an insurance component in financial products is less usual.
Distribution
The distribution of insurance products by banks is generally al-
lowed in most European countries, though under specified conditions.
For instance, in France, bank employees must qualify as an insurance
intermediary, while in Portugal distribution is permitted on the condi-
tion that no advice is involved. In Greece, distribution by banks is
allowed only in towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants, and in the
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hand, most European countries limit the distribution of financial prod-
ucts (other than insurance) by insurance companies.
Ownership Linkages
The convergence between the insurance and banking sectors is also
taking place at the company or institution level. Ownership linkages can
take various forms, such as minority or majority participations, estab-
lishment of a subsidiary, joint ventures, and the constitution of a
holding company. The regulatory frameworks in this regard vary
substantially from one country to another and are constantly changing
at the prospect of the EC single market. Nevertheless, certain trends can
be identified at the EC level concerning the establishment of subsidiaries
and direct participations.
Subsidiaries. With the exception of Belgium, all EC member states
allow banks to establish a subsidiary insurance company. (All but
Belgium also permit the establishment of a subsidiary bank by an
insurance company.) Such operations must comply with the specific
prudential rules and the general regulatory framework regarding par-
ticipations, thus ensuring legal independence. Both the bank and the
insurance supervisory authorities control the operation.
Cross-participations. Similarly, with the exception of Belgium, all EC
member states authorize direct participation of a bank in an insurance
company, though specific limits and requirements may be imposed in
order to avoid concentration of power and distortions in competition.
The EC Second Banking Directive limits shareholding participation of a
bank in a nonfinancial enterprise to 15 percent of own funds, but it does
not impose any limit on such participation in an insurance company.
Direct participation of an insurance company in a bank is also
allowed, but some member states (France, Germany, Greece, the
Netherlands, and Portugal) apply stricter rules and limits because of the
role banks play in the payment systems of a country, and in order to
ensure the sound financial position of insurance companies and, hence,
protect the policyholders. For instance, in Belgium and Germany, the
authorities regulate insurance companies’ participations in banks under
the criteria for the amounts of incorporating insurance companies’
technical reserves, while in the United Kingdom an insurance com-
pany’s assets must be held in a certain form. The situation in the EC,
and in Europe in general, is to be contrasted with that in the United
States, where such operations are strictly limited, and in Japan, where
they are prohibited.
Bank-insurance conglomerates. Cross-participations and establish-
ment of subsidiaries have given rise to the formation of bank-insurance
conglomerates. This is one of the most striking features of recent trends
in European financial markets, while in the United States and Japan,178 Sotirios Kollias
where banks’ domestic activities are more strictly circumscribed, the
bank securities firm or group is predominant. Even without ownership
linkages, the two components can be brought together under a holding
company with central management.
The regulations of virtually all EC countries permit the formation of
such conglomerates. Economies of scale and of scope are the main
advantages, while the risks include tied-in sales, dominant positions
through excessive concentration, internal credits avoiding prudential
rules, profits transfer, and so on. This is why some countries impose
limits on different aspects of inter-sector activities. For instance, Ger-
many, Denmark, and the United Kingdom limit internal credits.
At the EC level, the question of ownership linkages has been
discussed since 1985 under the general heading of "financial conglom-
erates." The most important issue appears to be that of cooperation of
the supervisory authorities. In a draft directive on the consolidation of
accounts of insurance companies, close cooperation among competent
supervisory authorities is required if a bank or a holding company
controls a subsidiary insurance company.
Conclusion
Traditionally fragmented and protected from external and domestic
competition, the European insurance markets are currently undergoing
important structural and regulatory changes. Market forces are playing
a role, as shown in the convergence of insurance with other sectors,
especially the banks, at the product, distribution, and institution levels,
but the main drive is the EC financial integration plan for the areas of
banking, investment, and insurance, and the single European market in
general, which has in turn accelerated the phenomenon of convergence.
As a result, 1992-induced strategic operations are taking place at a
vigorous pace, leading to the formation of bank-insurance conglomer-
ates by way of subsidiaries, participations, and distribution alliances.
The balance between the advantages and risks is not yet clear. But the
need for cooperation of supervisory authorities at both the national and
international levels is evident.THE STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE MARKETS IN EUROPE 179
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Foreign investment in the United States exceeds American invest-
ment overseas by much more than previously was thought. The U.S.
Department of Commerce estimates the shortfall at a minimum of $281
billion and possibly as high as $464 billion in 1989, the latest year for
which such data are available. This investment shortfall occurs as well
with regard to the U.S. and overseas insurance industries.
What is the significance of these numbers? Some will say they
simply prove that the United States is a good place to invest and that the
international capital markets are doing their proper job by sending
money here. Others will argue that the United States is no longer
competitive in world markets and we are rapidly mortgaging our future
to foreigners.
On which side falleth the insurance industry? And does the
structure of insurance industries abroad affect this growing imbalance?
In the discussion that follows, the reader will quickly detect a
personal bias. Speaking objectively, however, it is clear that the struc-
ture of our industry overseas is having an increasingly profound effect
here at home.
The World Market for Insurance
When last measured (for the year 1987), U.S. insurance industry
direct overseas investment totalled some $11 billion. Now that is a small
but measurable 3 percent of total U.S. overseas investment. Return on
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that investment was then 16.4 percent--about at the average of all
industries--but climbing. ~
The U.S. players are regrettably few. When Chubb first began its
own international expansion in the late 1950s, it had a number of U.S.
competitors--as many as 30 or 35. Chubb now counts itself one of only
a handful of U.S. property-casualty insurers with a global underwriting
and servicing presence.
In my judgment this condition is patently absurd. First of all, world
premium volume today exceeds $1 trillion and real premium growth is
several times that of world gross national product growth. The U.S.
market share of world premium volume declined from 43 percent to 37
percent in the two-year period ended in 1988. One-half of that decline
was the soft dollar, the other half was very real. And by not working
overseas, U.S. insurers and brokers intentionally deny themselves
access to 63 percent of the marketplace. That 63 percent enjoys a growth
rate far exceeding its 37 percent counterpart in the United States, and it
enjoys an insurance density (premiums per capita) only one-third of the
U.S. density.
What is wrong? One of the answers could be the American insurers’
domestic mind set, the fact that pressure to boost quarterly earnings per
share deprives U.S. executives of the longer-term vision needed to run
an international operation. Clearly, another reason could be the failure
to recognize that the U.S. premium pond is shrinking as a percentage of
the world market.
If some U.S. insurers are shortsighted, they are not as a class
myopic. They do not fear competition, nor do they lack resources. The
U.S. market is the world’s largest. It is wide open and competitive. But
protectionism is still a major factor in many countries. Consider, for
example, that 26 countries today, all outside the Communist bloc, deny
a license to operate to any foreign insurance company. India, the
world’s largest democracy, is a good example. In addition, approxi-
mately 30 countries mandate that all, or a portion, of ceded reinsurance
be placed with a state-owned or controlled reinsurance monopoly. What
is so bad about that? The government, using its monopoly, tends to set
the rates, allowing for little price or form competition. And the monop-
oly dissuades local companies from acquiring and utilizing the latest
insurance technologies developed in the more advanced markets. I
might add that, at worst, several of these government reinsurers are
bankrupt.
But is the playing field becoming more level so that U.S. insurers
can expect to have an easier time overseas in the future? Emphatically--
~ Data taken from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business,
August 1988.Henr~ G. Parker, III
"Yes!" First, a few major U.S. international insurers, including Chubb,
have consistently found ways to offer most of their products worldwide
to the U.S. exporter and overseas investor, in spite of regulatory
restrictions. And second, help has become available from the U.S.
federal government.
The U.S. insurance market is now responding to issues ranging
from nationalization and localization in developing nations, to licensing,
taxation, and market access in the industrial and industrializing coun-
tries. Our federal government has responded to barriers to trade in
services by enacting policies addressing the problem. Taiwan is an
example. Did you know that no United States insurance company could
insure Taiwanese persons or corporations as recently as four years ago?
Now more than a dozen U.S. companies are in Taiwan. Another
example is Korea. Under the August 1986 agreement settling our section
301 action under the Trade Act of 1974, guidelines for licensing U.S.
insurers in Korea were established, with follow-up mechanisms.
Longer term, the initiative that promises the greatest hope for
liberalization in the services industries, including insurance, is the
inclusion of services and insurance in the Uruguay round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. These initiatives
were launched four years ago, and until that point GATT had never
negotiated services or insurance. Last December, GATT stumbled over
agricultural disputes, and the negotiations stopped. Talks started again
in February and if successful, the talks will make it possible to look to a
future where discriminatory regulations in many markets will be re-
duced or eliminated. The vote in the Senate and House committees
recently supporting extension of "fast track" negotiating authority for
the President bodes well for a successful GATT conclusion.
Insurance industry structure abroad is changing rapidly--and no-
where more successfully than in the European Community. Sotirios
Kollias has described this brilliantly in his overview of the structure and
regulation of insurance markets in Europe.
The completion of the European internal market in insurance is a
priority objective of the EC Commission and, if approved, will be
accomplished by adoption of the Third Life and the Third Non-Life
Insurance Directives. The proposal for the Third Non-Life Directive was
approved by the Commission on July 18, 1990 and transmitted to the
Council. Regarding life insurance, the second stage was just reached last
November in the second directive, which governs freedom to provide
life insurance services.
The general strategy for the third stage, as in nonlife insurance, will
coordinate rules on the prudential and financial supervision of the
business; provide mutual recognition, on the basis of harmonization at
the Community level, of authorizations granted to insurance undertak-
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states; and grant a single authorization, valid in all member countries,
with supervision of the entire business of the entity in all 12 countries by
that company’s home member state (referred to as "home country
control"). Such a strategy has already been used to complete the internal
market in other financial services areas, and currently the insurance
industry in Europe is behind the times in re-regulating to accomplish a
single insurance market. The political will is there, in the form of the
single European act.
Now we need adoption of the Third Life and Non-Life Directives,
especially because all other Community financial products now benefit
from a "European Passport," distorting competition to the detriment of
those insurers, and especially life insurers, with whom other financial
entities compete directly within the Community in the case of certain
products. Clearly the "European Passport" for insurance will not occur
by January 1, 1993. 1995 is the earliest time when some form of real
market uniformity will be achieved. Reaching that stage may trigger
insolvencies over the next several years, especially in Spain, Portugal,
France, and Italy.
The European Community Market
When it happens, what will the insurance face of the European
Community look like?
Competition
Freedom of establishment and free exchange of services will
heighten competition. It has not been the custom, nor indeed the law, to
shop commercial and industrial risks across borders except for the
so-called "’large" commercial and industrial risks. Now insurers will.
Prices
The Cecchini report (1988) demonstrated how startling were differ-
ences in insurance costs among and between the member countries. As
an example, premium differences on identical fire and theft exposures
covering premises and stock were found to range from 15 percent below
the average in Luxembourg to 153 percent above the average in France,
and a startling 245percent above the average in Italy. If you relate those
price differentials to the vision of an insurance shopping supermarket
across Europe, you can begin to see the potential for wholesale price
reductions.184 Henry G. Parker, III
Expenses
In principle, underwriting expense ratios will be reduced because
some EC insurers will elect not to maintain expensive full-service offices
in each country where the risks are located.
Product Innovation
Innovative new products will appear. Uniformity of insuring terms
and conditions will appear, and this should benefit consumer, broker,
and underwriter alike. Bulk buying of coverages will entice underwriters
to "discount" as the result of newfound spread of risk, which did not
exist before. The Green movement and growing European sensitivity to
a cleaner environment have already produced regulations imposing
manufacturer compliance. Environmental liability offers a new signifi-
cant challenge--and opportunity--to insurers to whom European com-
mercial and industrial firms will look for protection. One would hope
that the experience of U.S. firms in areas such as product liability,
asbestosis, and other environmental liability areas will be of value to
European insurers.
Critical Mass
Anticipating the third directives, most of Europe’s largest insurers
have long since embarked on European strategic moves through acqui-
sition or alliance. Merger and acquisition activity is way up. Geograph-
ically, Italian, German, and French companies have been especially
active. The United Kingdom, with a mature but fragmented market
imposing few restrictions against acquisition, is a prime target. Exam-
ples of other geographical trends would be the domination of the
Belgian market by the French and of the Scandinavian market by the
Swedish. Functionally, merger and acquisition activity will blend indi-
vidual country underwriting and selMce facilities with distribution systems
offered by banking members of the same financial conglomerate.
Alternative Distribution Methods
Brokers are the major distribution source in northern Europe, less
so in southern Europe where exclusive or direct agents hold sway. But
the lack of firewalls between financial services institutions in the
European community means that even brokers and agents will not have
free run. Existing bank and insurer combinations mean that insurance
products, both life and property-casualty, are today being retailed over
bank and other financial service counters. This trend will continue,
across European borders. As such, the products focus on middle-income
consumers and on credit-related standard products, capitalizing on theDISCUSSION 185
bank’s advantage of having advance knowledge of the transaction. But
many other distribution methods can be found, including manufactur-
ers, who in Europe are often also in the financial services business.
Many own their own insurance companies. The workplace has become
a major channel of distribution in Europe. In addition, direct response
marketing is the latest fellow on the distribution block in Europe. Print
and television media, credit cards, and other direct response marketing
tools are aimed at the private-passenger auto market, life products,
hospital indemnity, and the like.
Accounts Directive
The European Community is striving to reach agreement on a
directive covering the accounting practices of insurance and reinsurance
companies. It is a complex directive and a key part of liberalization of the
industry in Europe. It will introduce a uniform structure, content, and
evaluation method for annual and consolidated accounts. But disputes
continue. One dispute concerns the treatment of reinsurance on com-
panies’ balance sheets and valuation rules. Some countries, led by the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, are pushing for the net ap-
proach, for liabilities that are shown net of reinsurance. Italy and France
object. They want a gross approach, with gross amounts only to appear
under liabilities, with the reinsurance figures being accounted as an
asset.2
How Are the U.S. Markets Coping?
First of all, the major U.S. international underwriters are already in
place. For Chubb, as an example, ~t992 began in 1967, when we formed
our Common Market insurance company headquartered in Brussels.
Chubb is licensed or has full-service branches in all Common Market
countries today, save one. AIG, CIGNA, Continental, Hartford, Trav-
elers and Kemper are broadly established as, indeed, are a handful of
other U.S. international insurers. The major U.S. brokers already have a
strong presence in Europe.
2 As I write this paper, Luxembourg, which currently holds the EC’s presidency,
wants all these problems resolved in a directive at the June 17, 1991 meeting of the
Ministers. I hope this will happen. But if it does not, the single European passport for
insurance will be delayed until it does.186 Hennj G. Parker, III
Will 1992 Attract Many Future Players from the United States?
It is unlikely, with the notable exception of the major U.S. life
companies, which are beginning to show renewed interest in overseas
markets. But if 1991 plays out as its proponents anticipate, I believe that
the current lack of interest on the part of U.S. property-casualty insurers
to study their opportunities in a $4 trillion economy will prove a strategic
mistake. The European Community is America’s chief trading partner,
accounting for $145 billion annually in combined imports and exports.
This is more than either Canada or Japan. If we were to include the
output of U.S.-owned companies in Europe and European-owned firms
here (think of the reverse flow insurance potential), the size of the
relationship is $1 trillion a year. And yet, in a past survey, the bulk of
U.S. insurance executives surveyed indicated a lack of interest in
European operations.
Is European Protectionism a Possibility?
A significant concern is that the leveling of prices, as the pricing war
seeks its own natural level, will spur a new protectionism after 1992. It
is not too early--EC protestations to the contrary notwithstanding--to
foresee a Europe, faced with a bleak cycle of underwriting deficits
brought on by transborder competition, reacting after 1992 by refusing
entry to markets outside of Europe that might then wish to enter.
The introduction of a reciprocity standard in the 1989 second life
insurance directive and into the 1989 banking directive has raised some
eyebrows. The concern is that Europe may not continue to provide
national treatment. Should the reciprocity provisions be adopted--and
the Commission denies this will happen--some U.S. markets are
concerned that the national insurance authorities in the European
Community might use this provision to exclude or limit U.S. company
positions in the hotly competitive market predicted for European
insurance after 1992. This fear has some basis. In the GATT, the EC
Commission negotiators argue that the U.S. system of state regulation is
discriminatory toward foreign insurers. An EC reciprocity provision,
were that to occur, would encourage a national insurance authority in
Europe to use the Commission’s GATT position on U.S. regulation as
the basis to question, delay, or possibly even refuse authorization to a
U.S. company.
A second matter relates to universal banking. Europe’s financial
institutions increasingly operate in a universal framework. In fact, at the
end of 1989, obstacles to bank ownership of insurers (and vice versa)
remained only in Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. And these
are about to disappear. We in the United States, on the other hand, have
a Glass-Steagall Act, a Bank Holding Company Act, and other provi-DISCUSSION 187
sions that keep financial activities separate. The EC Commission nego-
tiators have raised Glass-Steagall provisions as a trade barrier in the
GATT negotiations. Might our differences in internal regulatory prac-
tices, under a reciprocity standard, lead to questioning of the authori-
zation of a U.S. insurer, using as justification the EC GATT negotiators’
position? I am not concerned. I led the second U.S. insurance trade
delegation to the Commission in Brussels two months ago, and the
Commission verbally assured us that the Commission stands for na-
tional treatment, not reciprocity. But the threat itself seems to have had
a chilling effect on U.S. interests in European insurance markets. Verbal
assurances are not binding over time. Might the European Court have a
view different from that of the Commission?
Now, How about the Pacific Rim?
It is a little-understood fact that the insurance markets of Asia today
write well in excess of $200 billion a year in premiums. As such, they
hold 23 percent of world premium income, driven by Japan, the world’s
second largest insurance market. In 1988, the latest year for which we
have such statistics, the Asian markets grew collectively by 19.2 percent,
by far the fastest growth rate in the world. The EC market grew 9.2
percent--and in that year, the U.S. market grew 2 percent. (Note that
preliminary estimates for 1990 show annual U.S. premium growth back
up to 6.9 percent.) Asia has hardly slowed down since 1988. While
Europe 1992 makes all the headlines, the Pacific Basin exceeds the entire
European Economic Community in premiums, and its current rate of
premium growth ~is twice that of the EC. Not surprisingly, then, U.S.
and other alien insurers are interested, indeed anxious, to become a
presence in those markets, the more so because insurance density
(premiums per head of population) runs from $4 per person per year in
Indonesia and India, to $15 in Thailand, to $233 in Taiwan, to $392 in
South Korea, to $2300 in Japan--all this compared with $1700 in the
United States. And if you think Japan is tops, it is not. Switzerland is,
with $2320 in premiums per Swiss. Yes, the expansion prospects are
mind-boggling.
Effects on the U.S. Insurance Industry
Finally, we are witnessing in Europe, and in the Pacific, the
development of enormous diversified financial services firms. Many of
them already have capital and revenue bases that outstrip their U.S.
counterparts. Their insatiable appetite for new asset deployment play-
grounds has already brought many of them to our shores. Among those
that could be mentioned for 1990 alone were the acquisition of the Home188 Henry G. Parker, III
Insurance Company by TVH Acquisition Corporation and the purchase
of Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company by a subsidiary of Allianz AG
Holding. They followed the acquisition in 1989 of Maryland Casualty
Company by Zurich Insurance Company, of General Casualty Company
by Winterthur Swiss Insurance Company, and of Businessmen’s Assur-
ance Company of America by Assicurazioni Generali, Italy’s largest
insurer. Considering the strong financial services ties that most of these
European insurers have at home, one must ask the question: Will the
presence in the United States of entities of these foreign diversified
financial firms heighten the integration process for financial services in
the United States? I think the answer has to be "Yes." Indeed, non-U.S.
companies, including domestic companies controlled by foreign entities,
.already are major participants in every aspect of the U.S. financial
services market.
With respect to the banking sector, over 500 branches or agencies of
foreign banks are in the United States. Over 80 U.S. banks are foreign-
controlled, including some of the largest. Foreign banks from Europe
and Australia with unlimited insurance and securities powers in their
own countries are expanding operations in the United States. So far, and
consistent with the U.S. policy of national treatment, their non-banking
activities here are restricted to those permitted to U.S. banks. But how
long will this continue? And even today, do their more diversified
non-U.S, income streams give them a competitive advantage vis-a-vis
U.S. banks? Today, multifaceted Canadian companies are running
U.S.-based insurance, mutual fund, and investment banking opera-
tions, from manufacturing to wholesale and retail distribution. When
the trade ministers of the United States, Canada, and Mexico began
negotiations on June 12, 1991 in Toronto, the Canadians made no secret
of the fact that a further expansion of Canadian visitation rights into the
U.S. financial services arena was high on the Canadian agenda.
In 1986, 143 insurance branches, subsidiaries, and agencies had
been established in the United States by non-U.S, entities. Those
companies, in that year, accounted for an estimated $33 billion in
insurance sales or about 7 to 8 percent of the U.S. market. Today about
25 percent of the membership of the American Insurance Association is
foreign insurance companies, and today foreign companies write about
10 percent of total U.S. primary property-casualty premiums. Though it
would not appear so judging from the lack of interest on the part of the
U.S. insurance community, insurance is among the most global of
financial service activities. Inevitably, then, the structure of insurance
industries abroad will affect the structure of our domestic insurance
industry. Anything that contributes to a more rational distribution of the
available resources of the insurance industry will be good for develop-
ment on a world scale. And nothing would make so large a contribution
to this end as the recognition and implementation, by governments andDISCUSSION 189
by industry operators, of a nondiscriminatory, open-trade policy based
on the principles of national treatment. In the meantime, somebody
should compliment those insurance executives who embrace these
global imperatives, and wake up the ones who do not.
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Steven S. Skalicky*
Sotirios Kollias has prepared a comprehensive paper outlining the
structure and challenges facing the European insurance markets as 1992
approaches. Recent political and economic developments present the
same issues to the world community.
Barriers that have created highly fragmented national markets are
under attack throughout the world. Japan is currently targeting 1993-94
to remove market segregation between life and non-life companies and
the financial service industries. Eastern Europe, including the Soviet
Union, is in the midst of dismantling state insurance monopolies,
allowing foreign participation. China has permitted the formation of
a second state-owned insurer to compete with the PICC, and Hong
Kong is heading towards 1997. Latin American countries are exploring
the reshaping of state-owned monopolies, and Mexico has recently
expanded the allowed percentage of foreign ownership of insurance
companies.
While some areas will move more slowly than others, the changing
face of the global insurance markets in the 1990s will present challenges
and opportunities for the industry, the consumer, and the regulators
(Figure 1). I would like to highlight the structure of insurers in the major
growth markets aside from the European Community, and briefly point
out some issues that relate to regulation and solvency and the outlook
for the world’s insurers.
*Assistant Vice President and Deputy Comptroller, American International Group,
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Asia
Asia has the potential to be the fastest-growing market with the
most volume in the 1990s. With a 27.5 percent share of the total world
insurance market for 1988, Asia is the third largest segment following
North America’s 39 percent and Europe’s 30 percent. Asia’s real growth
rate of 19.2 percent far outpaced Europe’s rate of 8.3 percent and North
America’s 2.1 percent. Japan is the dominant market in Asia, represent-
ing 24 percent of the world market share, and as a country it ranks first192 Steven S. Skalicky
Table 1
The World’s Largest Insurers
A. The World’s 10 Largest Stock Insurers, Ranked by Premium Volume, 1989
Millions of U.S. Dollars
Premium Income
Market
Company/Country Total Life Non-Life Assets Value
AIIstate/U.S. (Parent:
Sears, Roebuck) $14,345 $1,056 $13,289 $34,010 $11,533
Aetna Life & Casualty/U.S. 13,311 2,538 10,773 87,099 5,669
American International
Group/U.S.                11,524 2,995 8,529 46,143 12,358
CIGNA/U.S. 11,494 1,494 10,000 57,779 3,676
Zurich Insurance/
Switzerland                 9,592 2,311 7,281 37,191 5,566
Prudential/U.K. 9,394 7,702 1,692 63,138 8,079
UAP-Union des
Assurance/France 9,204 4,710 4,494 45,835 7,457
Allianz Group/Germany 8,494 3,681 4,813 54,169 28,454
Travelers/U.S. 7,793 3,203 4,590 56,563 2,814
Swiss RE/Switzerland 7,658 1,343 6,315 23,493 3,599
B. The World’s 10 Largest Mutuals, Ranked by Premium Volume, 1989
Millions of U.S. Dollars
Premium Total
Company/Country Income Assets Surplus
Nippon Life/Japan $36,526 $161,743 $ 5,421
DAI-ICHI Mutual/Japan 26,404 112,427 3,716
Prudential/U.S. 25,094 163,967 4,780
Sumitomo Life/Japan 24,271 95,952 2,973
Zenkyoren/Japan 23,319 123,268 1,940
State Farm Mutual/U.S. 23,254 57,155 18,028
Meiji Mutual/Japan 16,491 62,161 1,980
Metropolitan Life/U.S. 15,193 98,740 3,787
Asahi Mutual/Japan 12,460 51,570 1,852
Mitsui Mutual Life/Japan 10,390 39,484 1,322
Source: A. Ourusoff in Financial World, September 4, 1990.1989 data. State Farm data for Surplus taken
from The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1990.
in life business, with 35 percent of world premiums, and second in
non-life, with 13 percent of world premiums.
Japan is characterized by a relatively small number of companies,
fewer than two hundred, compared to the thousands in the United
States and Europe, with the major companies comprising the bulk of the
market. Life premiums in Japan amounted to $214 billion in 1988 and
non-life business amounted to approximately $70 billion, with 37 per-
cent of the business allocated to a savings element, which is unusualDISCUSSION 193
compared to the rest of the world. The top 15 companies represent 95
percent of the market, with foreign companies representing 3 percent of
the total non-life market.
Companies are organized as mutuals or stock companies with a
segregation of life and non-life business. Japanese mutual life companies
comprise the majority of the top 10 mutual insurance companies in the
world (Table 1). Business is conducted primarily through agents with
affinity tie-ins to companies and associations.
The Ministry of Finance regulates the Japanese insurance industry
and also controls banks and the securities industry. Premiums, invest-
ments, and surplus requirements are strictly supervised. Companies are
required to maintain assets locally equal to technical reserves, and
certain types of assets, such as equities and real estate, are restricted. No
solvency fund is maintained for the benefit of policyholders.
Current proposals are directed at freeing the distinction between
life and nonqife business and banking and securities companies. Re-
forms are also directed at easing restrictions on the composition of
assets, including real estate, equities, and foreign currencies.
Recent deregulation of premium rates to a range rather than one
fixed rate resulted in all companies choosing the lowest premium rate.
Allowing banks to pay a higher interest rate created a net outflow from
the insurance industry. Nippon Life is as big as the entire Japanese
non-life industry. Japanese banks rank as the largest companies in the
world, with the top five being three times as large as Nippon Life (Table
2). Given the propensity of the Japanese consumer to save, and the
savings feature inherent in most insurance products, deregulation will
likely increase competition for the consumer’s savings, thus reducing
margins.
The market is technically open to foreign competition; however,
with licensing requirements taking up to two years and the affinity
relationships of agents, it is a difficult market to enter. Recently some
movement to speed up approval of foreign companies has occurred as a
result of political pressure from other nations.
The Japanese property-casualty insurance market has high expense
ratios, approximately 40 percent, with loss ratios of approximately 50
percent, low compared to the United States and Europe. Litigation is
minimal; however, companies are becoming wary of overseas liability.
Expansion to overseas markets has generally taken the form of partici-
pation retaining local management, or branch office operations to
service Japanese business operations in local markets. The one exception
was the acquisition of Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company by
Toyota Motor Corporation with the intent of insuring autos produced in
the United States.
Its size and growth potential obviously make Japan a major market
for companies that hope to be global insurers. And the resources of194 Steven S. Skalicky
Table 2
The 10 Largest Companies in the World, Ranked by Assets, 1990
Assets
(Millions of
Company Country U.S. Dollars)
Dai-lchi Kangyo Bank Ltd. Japan $472,223
Sumitomo Bank Ltd. Japan 470,699
Fuji Bank Ltd. Japan 469,086
Sanwa Bank Ltd. Japan 450,180
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. Japan 410,815
Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd. Japan 331,326
Tokai Bank Ltd. Japan 285,843
Barclays PLC United Kingdom 241,210
Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank Ltd. Japan 237,981
Bank of Tokyo Ltd. Japan 234,771
Source: Forbes, April 29, 1991, p. 165.
Japanese companies could make them global insurers, if their strategy
changes.
Life and non-life are generally segregated in Asian countries and
distribution systems are primarily agency with rates set by tariff,
although compliance varies. Supervision and regulation are fairly strict
and foreign participation is subject to restrictions. Aside from South
Korea, which represents 1.4 percent of the total and 2.2 percent of life
insurance, no other country in Asia approaches 1 percent of world
premiums. However, the growth rates in China, the Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand are all in double digits,
ranging from 10 percent to 23 percent. Life insurance growth has been
higher than nonqife.
The attraction of these markets is not the current premium but
rather the potential that will be generated as the consumer’s per capita
income increases and industrial production expands. China’s insurance
density is currently 2.5. If China were to approximate Japan’s 2,320, the
market would be twice the size of current total world premiums.
Latin America
The insurance market in Latin America represents less than 1
percent of the world’s total and has been characterized by state monop-
olies, restricted foreign entry, and a limited number of companies in
each country. The growth potential, however, is significant as economic
growth and per capita income increase.
Perhaps the most optimism centers around Mexico, which willDISCUSSION 195
benefit if the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) takes
effect in 1993. Joining Canada, the United States, and Mexico, the
aggregate GNP and population of this free trade zone would exceed
those of the European Community. If successful, NAFTA could prompt
other Latin American countries to speed free market reforms currently
underway.
The insurance industry grew by 15 percent in Mexico in 1989.
Forty-three companies were in operation; 37 were privately owned, two
were mutuals, two were reinsurers and two were state-owned. Plans are
underway to sell the state-owned companies to private investors. The
allowable foreign ownership of companies was recently increased to 49
percent, resulting in four outside purchases. Seven companies dominate
80 percent of the market.
Since deregulation in 1989, the insurance market in Mexico has seen
downward pressure on rates. Only one of the five largest companies
reported a positive result in 1990. Distribution channels are mass
marketing and agents. The General Directorate of Insurance and Secu-
rities regulates the industry and requires 35 percent of technical reserves
to be deposited with the Central Bank.
Other countries in Latin America are also reviewing the easing of
restrictions on insurance markets. Uruguay is considering a bill that
would eliminate the national monopoly. Reforms are being debated in
Peru, where the market is dominated by the state-owned insurance
company. Venezuela anticipates changes to increase foreign equity in
banks; insurance may follow. Colombia is undergoing reforms to change
the restrictive tariff structure, required local reinsurance, and mandatory
investments in government bonds. Chile and Bolivia already represent
comparatively open markets with growth potential. Brazil and Argen-
tina must overcome current problems with internal reinsurance monop-
olies before they can open to additional investment. Argentina may
eliminate its reinsurance monopoly before year end. The potential for
Latin America is similar to that for other emerging markets: growth.
Eastern Europe
Reforms underway in Eastern Europe are allowing foreign partici-
pation and ownership in markets that were previously state-owned
monopolies. The 1988 world market share, including the Soviet Union,
was approximately 3 percent. The Soviet Union represents almost 75
percent of the total, because of its size and population. As with other
emerging markets, the attraction is growth potential.
Transition from state control, with its implications for premiums
and for claims, will follow other political and economic changes.
Changes will take time, varying by country as the economic transitions196 Steven S. Skalicky
take place. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are furthest
along.
Distribution systems in Eastern Europe have largely been through
banks and other outlets with little need for agents under monopolistic,
required insurance. Premiums were fixed at low rates and claims were
paid with state subsidies as needed. Claims were high, with no change
in premium. These characteristics will have to change in a free market.
One insurer has already depleted its start-up capital of $320 million as a
result of losses in the auto liability sector in East Germany.
Insurance laws are in the process of being written to set up the
structure, supervision, and foreign participation in the Eastern Euro-
pean insurance market. Solvency regulation faces problems with the old
structure for state-owned monopolies; however, new entrants will be
required to meet the regulations.
As the economies expand and per capita income rises, the potential
for insurance markets will grow. Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union
in particular, obviously face more problems than the European Com-
munity or Asia.
Conclusion
Globalization of the insurance industry will present unprecedented
challenges to the insurance companies, the consumers, and the regula-
tors responsible for monitoring companies. Opportunities will exist for
those companies that are able to take advantage of changes that present
true economic benefits. Because of the difficulty of entry and enormous
start-up costs for a new insurer in a market, the major thrust towards
globalization will be mergers and acquisitions. This will favor the larger
companies, which have the capitalization and resources to achieve
market penetration. An analyst from a major brokerage firm has
suggested that by the turn of the century it is possible that no more than
12 to 15 major global insurers will be in business. Size does offer
advantages for efficiency of scale as well as the ability to absorb the costs
necessary for expansion. Blindly pursuing acquisitions, however, also
can lead to disaster. Acquisitions in emerging European markets are
currently priced in the range of 20 to 30 times earnings, whereas U.S.
companies averaged 10 in 1989.
Rate competition will benefit consumers through higher rates of
return for life products and lower premiums for non-life coverage. The
risk to the consumer, however, is that the promise to pay may not be
kept. Relying on gains in real estate and securities to offset underwriting
losses, or to meet unrealistic interest rate guarantees, eventually leads to
problems in the industry. We are already seeing this in the United
States, and Japan and Europe may follow. Malaysia recently took controlDISCUSSION 197
of an insurer to prevent insolvency. Allowing additional competition
from banks and other institutions may only compound these issues.
While financial companies have significant assets that could be used for
acquisition entry into the insurance industry, such entry should be
based on segregated capital, because of the additional risk undertaken.
The fact that insurance is a risk-taking business must not be
forgotten. Determination of liability years after coverage makes the risk
unique among financial service products. In the United States it is
estimated that environmental liability cleanup will cost in excess of $40
billion, with the assignment of liability creating unparalleled litigation
and costs. Anticipating the liability and costs was impossible when these
products were originally priced.
Regulators will be faced with the challenge of dealing with compa-
nies that are involved in markets, products, and cultures that differ from
those they have become accustomed to. Representative John D. Dingell
has stated that "The regulatory system must anticipate and deal effec-
tively with the activities of the pirates and dolts who inevitably will
plague an attractive industry such as insurance, where customers hand
over large sums of cash in return for a promise of future benefits.’’1
While pirates must be dealt with individually, the dolts referred to were
managers who pursued business with little understanding of the ulti-
mate costs involved and the long-term impact. Regulators will have to
monitor closely the international expansion of companies entering new
markets, with increased competition narrowing margins and profits.
The changes taking place in the 1990s will present opportunities for
companies able to adapt and take advantage of these new markets. They
will also present challenges to the consumer and to the regulators, who
must monitor the industry.
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